There were still extensive forest regions to be met with, although not all forests were extensively planted with trees, despite the processes of disafforestation which had been going on for centuries. The Forest of Dean contained the only substantial deposits of iron ore that the royalists were able to keep for a time in their power, hence the importance to Parliament of its garrison in Gloucester which managed on the whole to restrict royalist activity in the Forest.
The forests, however, presented no major obstacle to the movement of men and supplies, as they had presented no real obstacle to the progressive colonisation of the land in previous centuries. The arteries of the Kingdom were its roads and waterways, and it was upon their capacity to facilitate movement of large bodies of men that much campaigning turned.
Most roads, even the major routes, were in fact appalling, there being no single authority responsible for their overall condition. Perhaps because of road conditions, means of transport were limited. Wagons and carts were not common everywhere: in Cornwall, for example, wheeled vehicles were scarcely seen, and the same was true of large parts of Yorkshire and of the West of England generally.
Most carriage was by packhorse team, and most people, if they could not afford horses, rode very rarely, travelling mostly on foot. Sledges at all seasons of the year were not unusual, and carts on revolving axles and often two-wheeled were about the best most parts of the country could afford.
The nearer to London and to the Home Counties, the more likely the traveller would be to find wagons and coaches, but in most of England over which the civil wars were fought, transport was hideously difficult and restricted. Many complaints made of horses being plundered from their owners by armies on the move suggest that horses were not only seized for cavalry mounts, but also to provide means of carriage.
Some heavy cannon, for example, the demi-culverin and culverin, required teams of seven and eight horses respectively to pull them, equivalent to between 40 and 50 men. The common sense of having campaigning seasons restricted to months when good weather could be anticipated is clear. Armies moved slowly anyway, and in winter they might not move at all, at least, not in any large numbers, or if they did so, might be so strung out across the countryside as to lose all order of march.
In open-field England, moreover, roads or trackways were by no means fixed and constant features of the terrain; they shifted as cropping practices dictated in whichever rotation, two, three or four field, was followed in a given area. It was quite normal, where roads did exist as a fixed feature, for travellers even in times of peace to spread themselves a hundred yards or more either side of a route to try to find firmer going, trampling crops underfoot and presumably getting away with it.
Armies on the move would do this with impunity, and they would also not infrequently steal the crops in the fields if the season was right. Thus England was a country x where the major roads were defined but often impassable in places, and where the minor tracks were as often as not equally as treacherous and by no means fixed. The Nature of Armies It used to be maintained that the rough division of the country which prevailed after civil war began, the parliamentarian zone of the South and SouthEast and East against the royalist zone of the North, Wales and the West, corresponded to areas of allegiance.
That is to say, that the backward, pastoral regions supported the King, and the more forward-looking eastern areas, Parliament. Allegiance did not follow any geographical divisions, and although Kent remained firmly parliamentarian because of the proximity of London, dozens of Kentish gentlemen and others abandoned their county and served the King elsewhere.
Similarly, Norfolk and Suffolk were not so firmly parliamentarian because of their geographical location, but because what gentry there was in those counties tended to be for the Parliament. Their outnumbered royalist neighbours either kept quiet or quit the counties, rather as parliamentarian gentry fled from areas under royalist domination. The civil war split the country deeply, and all areas provided men for both armies at one time or another. The campaigning regions of the Midlands and South-West produced forces and supporters for both sides, and if the numbers of men available to the King declined as the war went on and the royalist cause suffered reverses, nevertheless some kind of balance was maintained by the overall quality of the royalist commanders in the field who, man for man, were probably better at their jobs than their opponents.
The first civil war lasted four years, and that it lasted so long must be taken as evidence of the widespread support that both sides enjoyed.
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It was never a case of an unpopular royalist faction trying to overcome a populist parliamentarian movement, for if it had been, the war would have gone against the King at the outset. The King, after all, had no army to call upon instantly in , nor, apart from forces readied for Ireland, did the Parliament. England possessed no standing army as such, nor had it traditionally maintained one. Apart from the monstrous expense of such an undertaking, there was no real need for it.
Foreign mercenaries had been employed when necessary in the sixteenth century, particularly during the troubles with Scotland in the reign of Edward VI, and were used against rebels in East Anglia and the West Country in Foreign mercenaries had proved almost as unpopular as the native-born soldiery, and there was a general reluctance on the part of most of the English people to involve themselves in military matters. Nevertheless, in a country where no army existed, two emerged in the course of and developed into fairly formidable fighting forces during the course of That of the royalists disappeared entirely in , but that of Parliament survived attempts to disband it after victory was won, and became the arbiter of political matters from onwards.
Where did these armies come from? That is an historical nonsense.
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There were enough native-born English and Welsh prepared to venture their lives for one side or the other to make civil war a feasible proposition. These had undergone considerable reorganisation under the Tudors, and the country divided into zones of military importance, the most important of which came under the control of the Parliament in Edgehill indicated that this was not the case. Like all civilian armed forces, their quality depended much upon their sense of commitment and that of their officers, and these were variable throughout the country.
The Trained Bands could encompass anyone between 16 and 60 years of age of sufficient social standing to be entrusted with arms for the defence of the Kingdom. Although monthly training schedules were expected, in reality some Bands hardly met together at all, and then often only for convivial reasons. Under Tudor military reforms, responsibility for the Trained Bands had been vested in the Lords Lieutenant of counties, usually the most powerful nobleman resident in a county or else appointed because of his general standing.
In the s the Lieutenant had been made responsible for the appointment and pay of professional soldiers, known as Muster Masters, whose task was to train and discipline the local levies. Given a lethargic attitude on the part of the Lord Lieutenant or his deputies, and an overall lack of urgency in the international situation, a general neglect followed. Local gentry often sought to avoid the financial implications of office in their Band, but their involvement was essential. The whole concept of the Band was that it should reflect the social order in arms; officered by the gentry, with yeomen, small farmers and others of reasonable standing acting as non-commissioned officers and the rank and file.
Largely due to the local nature of these forces, therefore, even when they were in any state of readiness, they were reluctant and often would not march far from their home base. Even the best Trained Bands, those of London, which turned back the royalist army at Turnham Green in November , proved wilful and sometimes mutinous when marched away to the West as part of a larger army.
They were, on the whole, the London Bands included, notoriously unreliable, yet these were the forces to whom Parliament and the King were obliged to turn in to provide at least the core of an army. Parliament had taken upon itself the right to raise and dispose of armed forces within the Kingdom, through the powers of the Militia Ordinance of , which the King rightly saw as an act of supreme defiance of his own authority in the military sphere. Attempts to raise the Trained Bands in by the Parliament and by the King often led to unhappy divisions within county Bands themselves.
For example, when the parliamentarian governor of Hull raised Trained Bands from its locality to add muscle to his refusal to admit the King to the port, Charles retaliated by raising other Yorkshire Trained Bands to use against those in Hull. Clearly, Trained Bands of any one county could not be expected to fight against each other in a civil war, even supposing those available were capable of achieving anything. Instructions were issued to the Lords Lieutenant to raise the Bands, who in their turn xii delegated the task to their deputies, gentry of substance within a given county who might also be Trained Band commanders themselves.
The King countered this with the Commission of Array, an ancient means of levying troops which bypassed the Lord Lieutenant if he were unreliable and gave direct instruction to the county sheriff to mobilise forces. The Commission of Array not only empowered the raising of the Bands, but also the raising of volunteer regiments, and it was on the formation of volunteer armies that the civil war was prosecuted by both sides. The Trained Bands, unless their colonels actively brought them in on one side or the other, often found themselves stripped of their arms and equipment in favour of the volunteer units, and whilst the Bands themselves more or less melted away, numbers of their members enlisted in volunteer regiments.
The importance to the Parliament of the London Bands has already been indicated. The creation of volunteer forces did not entirely break with the Trained Band concept. Like the Bands, these had regional, county or district origins, but unlike the Bands, the volunteer infantrymen or cavalrymen were paid to fight wheresoever they were commanded to go, and on the whole could be relied upon to follow their orders.
The volunteer armies made the civil war possible, indeed they may be said to have prolonged it, and since at the start of the wars anyway, there was a considerable degree of balance numerically between both armies, it must be clear that, whether men knew what they were fighting for or not, there was no shortage of men prepared to fight. Like the Bands, also, the volunteer regiments were known by the names of their commanders, their colonels: the more popular or prestigious an officer, the more likely he would be to at least maintain his regimental strength in relation to other regiments, even though he might not reach the prescribed strength for his regiment, whether of infantry, cavalry or dragoons.
As the war dragged on, so both sides resorted to impressment to boost their numbers, even drafting in captured prisoners of war, but this was largely an unsuccessful procedure, and probably led to more desertions than had been the case when the armies were genuinely and largely volunteer in structure. It is certainly the case that mutiny or near-mutiny was not an uncommon feature in both armies, attributable not only to reluctance to fight, but to want of pay or poor conditions as well. Nor was mutiny necessarily confined to the meaner sorts of men who made up the infantry regiments. In this case, the potential mutineers were given leave to go to Yorkshire, where they performed prodigiously, but most potential mutinies were averted one way or another.
To balance the picture, there was also evidence of a very marked self-sacrificing approach to the war on both sides by various regiments. They were essentially an elite. Cornish regiments stormed Lansdown Hill in and plucked victory out of a potential rout by virtue of their dogged determination and the example of their commander, who died at their head.
When all around them had fled in panic, a Scottish regiment of horse stood its ground on Marston Moor until it was overwhelmed. The success of armies depended upon the quality of generals, and by and large the armies of the civil war years were commanded by a strange assortment of men. Parliament had the earl of Essex, much-underrated by historians, but despite Lostwithiel a competent man beloved by his army, and, of course, Cromwell, who rose to prominence from mid onwards. Sir Thomas Fairfax, like Prince Rupert, had his days, although he was probably a better army commander than was Rupert, whose capacity for alienating those of his own side was almost as great as his capacity for inspiring loyalty amongst his chosen subordinates.
Individual regimental commanders stood out on both sides. What is often not recognised is the fact that on the whole, there was quite a considerable array of military talent available in the civil war years, partly if not wholly due to the wide experience gained by many civil war commanders in the wars in Europe.
As it happened, the majority of those semi-professional commanders opted to serve the King, although the royalists lost a chance to have the services of Edward Massey, the successful parliamentarian governor of Gloucester. If, man for man as has been suggested, the royalist commanders were the best of the bunch, parliamentarian resilience saved them from defeat, coupled with the inability of the royalists to capitalise upon their early successes and the forging of the military alliance with the Scots in Prescribed regimental strengths were hardly ever attained or, if reached, rarely maintained.
The number for an infantry regiment was reckoned to be around 1, men divided into ten companies. Inferior company officers were lieutenant, ensign, two sergeants, three corporals and two drummers.
Each company was two-thirds musketeers and one-third pikemen. Horse regiments were reckoned to be around strong. They were the same in both armies, with six troops commanded by field officers i. Parliamentary regiments, however, had no lieutenant colonels. This was true for dragoons also, although dragoons mounted infantry as often as not formed troops within cavalry regiments or worked as units of less than regimental strength. It was the responsibility of the commissioned colonel of a regiment, and of his subordinate field officers, to recruit the regiment to somewhere near a respectable size often, since the war treasuries were rarely adequately supplied with money, financing forces from his own pocket.
Certain royalist regiments more or less melted away as a consequence of this, and the financial problem certainly militated against the King more than it did against Parliament. Naturally, one of the inducements to bring volunteers into a regiment was the rate of pay offered, but pay was sometimes as much as two years in arrears, and xiv plunder and free quarter were the only means which the bulk of the rank and file had of keeping body and soul together. War weariness was as much attributable to lack of pay as anything else, and soldiers tended to wander off despite the punishment for desertion, if they could find no other inducement to stay.
It may well appear that the war effort of both sides was a pretty ramshackle affair. Whilst there was a good deal of courage displayed on both sides, desertion in battle and at other times was a constant problem for commanders, as was mutiny. As shortage of money made itself felt, and with lack of adequate provisions, soldiers began to live off the countryside, their treatment of the civilian population reflecting their own desperation.
In the wartorn regions of the South-West and the Welsh border, it was hardly surprising that country people should band together against the depredations of both armies, sometimes with success. For the most part country people themselves, the rank and file, would often drift off homewards at harvest time, although how far this was a serious problem is difficult to quantify. Evidence suggests that those most likely to volunteer for military service would be the surplus mouths of a community, under-worked younger sons and brothers, or wilder spirits tired of their rural life style.
They might be likely to plunder a harvest field but hardly likely to go home to help get one in, unless it made a good excuse to take a few weeks leave. Once these troops were committed to battle, however elaborately or well laid the plans of their generals might be, all turned upon circumstance whether a regiment stood and fought or turned and ran, and the qualities of the regimental and company or troop commanders were of the highest importance. The generals might well propose, but it was the inferior officers who could dispose by their attention to their duty.
One side of a battlefield might as well have been a hundred miles from the other side, so entirely isolated in their efforts were the men involved. At Marston Moor the Scottish and parliamentarian commanders in chief fled the field because they saw their own right wing scattered by a royalist charge, and it was Cromwell, cavalry well in hand, who swept around the field and undid the damage done by that royalist assault.
The Scottish general was twenty miles away or more when he heard the news, but it is not apparent that either he or his fellow generals were reproached. Within the limitations of the battlefield, they did what they saw as necessary or opportune: all turned ultimately on what their subordinates in the thick of the fight did, and how successful they were. Lacking all the technical equipment which modern armies possess to inform themselves of the progress of events although no guarantee against errors of judgement in themselves civil war commanders threw their forces into the hands of fate every time they resolved upon battle, and no single civil war engagement can be singled out as a foregone conclusion, unless it be a minor ambush or a well co-ordinated surprise raid on sleeping enemy troops.
The Structure of the Atlas In the following maps and accompanying commentaries, the reader is taken through the civil wars chronologically. A few maps show the state of the country overall at certain periods. Most maps look at particular regions where fighting was widespread, outlining the key stages of the fighting in those regions. These maps show the development of campaigns, the sites of battles, sieges and skirmishes. Some maps consider particularly important battles.
For each battle there are generally two maps, one showing the locality and the precise site of the battle in relation to surrounding villages, the second showing the field xv itself in more detail and illustrating the action and the movements of the armies. Maps covering events in Scotland and Ireland are included also. For each map there is a page of commentary which provides relevant background and an outline of the events portrayed on the map. The standard symbol for a battle site has been used and dates on the maps indicate the date of a battle, the fall of a town, the entry of an army into a particular town, as appropriate.
Counties referred to are, of course, the pre— counties. As early as there were hopes of a closer, parliamentary union, to offset the personal union represented by Charles, but internal divisions and contradictions led Scotland first to ally with Parliament in , then to revert to loyalty to the Crown and, as a consequence, to end up as a military occupied country from until Nevertheless, Scottish resistance to the King encouraged that of Englishmen in , as did the inability of the King effectively to counter Scottish insurgence.
Aberdeen was surrendered to Montrose, a covenanting general, and only Threave and Caerlaverock Castles on the border remained in loyal hands. Charles intended to raise 30, men to take into Scotland, but recruiting was slow, and he was advised to wait a year. Despite the advice, Charles was determined to invade Scotland, and to send the marquis of Hamilton by sea to the Firth of Forth. Charles was at York on 30 March, whilst Hamilton lay at Yarmouth with 5, men ready to sail. He anchored before Leith on 1 May but the covenanters were obdurate, and the King hesitated in his plans.
On 14 May he reached Newcastle, whilst Scottish royalists occupied Turriff and Aberdeen the latter briefly. On the 30th Charles lay at Birks near Berwick with 20, men, with forward troops across the border at Duns. This manoeuvre caused the Covenanters to advance on Kelso, which they held on 3 June against a counterattack.
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Two days later the Scottish army came to Duns and offered to negotiate with Charles, who agreed, but away north Aberdeen was again occupied by royalist troops and had to be stormed by Montrose on 18 and 19 June. On the 18th, the two sides reached agreement at Berwick, termed a treaty but to all intents and purposes merely a truce.
When the Short Parliament met on 13 April plans for the reduction of Scotland were laid before it. The Commons proved unwilling to be coerced into sanctioning further military efforts, and Parliament was dissolved on 5 May. Urged on by Strafford, Charles was bent upon the suppression of Scotland, raising a new army under the earl of Northumberland.
Within Scotland, only Threave, Caerlaverock, Edinburgh and Dumbarton were in royalist hands, and on the day that the Short Parliament was dissolved covenanting troops entered Aberdeen, centre of royalist resistance. Meanwhile the main Scottish army began to assemble on the border with England, and the invasion of England was decided upon on 3 August. This finally drove Montrose and other former Covenanters into open rift with their party, but too late to alter the course of events. On 20 August, as the King left London for the north, the Scottish army rolled across the border into Northumberland and came to Newburn on the Tyne on 27 August.
In their rear, Dumbarton had fallen, Caerlaverock was undergoing vigorous siege, and in September Lord Ettrick was to surrender Edinburgh into covenanting hands. Helpless, Charles summoned a Great Council to York for 24 September, Parliament was summoned to meet on 3 November, and on 2 October negotiations began at Ripon with the Scots which were to lead to the Treaty of Ripon. MAP 2 Flashpoints of Civil War in the Summer of Although civil war did not formally break out until the King raised his standard on 22 August at Nottingham, the summer had seen both sides flexing their muscles and striving for advantage on a localised level.
The physical division between the King and his Parliament came in March, when Charles arrived in the city of York on the 18th of that month and established his court there. It was in Yorkshire that first overt royalist action took place when, on 3 May, Sir Francis Wortley reportedly drew his sword and swore to maintain the King against his Parliament, and began to raise horse for the royal service. In Lancashire on 25 May a gathering of local Catholic gentry near Lancaster was dispersed by the High Sheriff, a royalist, as being premature, but on 20 June agents of the Lord Strange seized magazines in Preston, Warrington and Liverpool.
On 4 July Strange attacked the puritan town of Manchester in some force but was driven off after inconclusive fighting. From York, on 20 June, the earl of Newcastle, future royalist commander in the north, was sent to secure the port of Newcastle upon Tyne and Tynemouth and with them the Northumberland and Durham coalfield. The King, having been refused entry to Hull in April, advanced on the port from York on 3 July, and on the 10th the first fighting took place.
The King abandoned the profitless siege. Somerset also saw some early action. On 11 July the marquess of Hertford was sent there from York by the King to raise men, and on the 19th Parliament sent Alexander Popham to do the same on its behalf. This developed into an armed confrontation between local country people, raised by the Sheriff as a posse comitatus, and the royalist forces. After plundering the town of weapons, the royalists withdrew to Wells. Elsewhere in the county, Strode and John Pyne on behalf of the Parliament were seeking to combine their separate forces, to move against Wells.
On the 5th, therefore, the marquess withdrew without offering battle, making his way towards Glastonbury. As well as these formalised developments, there were reports of riots and affrays in Rayleigh, Essex; Aylesbury, Buckinghamshire; and Isham in Northamptonshire.
Confrontation was avoided when the parliamentary commander, Lord Brooke, agreed to leave the guns in Banbury. Dover Castle was taken by Parliament on 21 August, the day before the royal standard was unfurled. MAP 3 Prelude to Edgehill With the raising of the royal standard on 22 August at Nottingham, amidst inauspicious beginnings, formal war was declared on the Parliament. After recruiting forces at York, the King had moved to Nottingham to increase his power, preparatory to a march on London and an anticipated rapid victory.
From Nottingham, however, he marched westwards to Shrewsbury, to the rich recruiting grounds of Wales and the borders. The army of the Parliament under the earl of Essex, appointed Captain General on 13 July, was drawn largely from London and the Home Counties, and when mustered at Northampton an ideal place for securing footwear for the men on 14 September six days before the King entered Shrewsbury was superior in strength to its opponents. Morale was another question. The first real test for detachments of the two armies was to take place on 23 September.
Although lying between London and the King, the earl of Essex determined to move west also, and to take the city of Worcester. The King initially sought to strengthen the city by sending Prince Rupert with mounted troops to reinforce Sir John Byron there, but the defences were wholly inadequate, and Rupert ordered withdrawal. To forestall a surprise attack during the evacuation, Rupert moved his forces forward to Powick Bridge.
There were counsels of caution for Brown, but he determined to march on, since the main army of the Parliament was itself drawing closer to the city. As the parliamentarian advance guard crossed the bridge, they were met by fierce musket fire, under cover of which the royalist cavalry mounted up ready for action.
Edwin Sandys, commanding the parliamentary vanguard, pushed on, and was charged with devastating effect as he sought to deploy beyond the bridge. John Brown was able to hinder royalist pursuit, but the damage was done, and the first cavalry victory had gone to Rupert. King Charles, encouraged by the success and the captured colours brought to him, set out from Shrewsbury on 12 October, again aiming for London.
There was also the problem to be overcome of facing the King in arms in the field, and the consequence of failure once that was done. The earl quit Worcester on 19 October to put himself again between the King and London, and both armies now moved slowly, bogged down by treacherous weather conditions. It was also evident that neither side quite knew where the other was, and the factor of poor intelligence dogged both sides throughout the civil war. The royalists had the advantage of surprise, and a reconnaissance party set out for Kineton. Orders were issued for the royalist army to draw into battle order on Edgehill on 23 October.
From the bare Edgehill a plain ran down towards Kineton township, giving the royalist commanders overall view of the field, but obstructed by enclosures near Kineton itself. Nevertheless, the King could not advance with Essex left unharmed in his rear. The earl was advised of the royalist dispositions by eight in the morning, but his own army was strung out in various quarters, and he was in no hurry to fight. Reinforcements were also anticipated. If the worst came to the worst he could fall back on Warwick, whilst Banbury garrison remained unmolested.
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The leisurely way in which battle was prepared for allowed time for the rival commanders to concentrate upon tactics, many of the royalists at least having had considerable European war experience. The Prince then moved to join the royalist right wing of cavalry, whilst Henry Wilmot commanded the left. After a desultory cannonade from both sides causing few casualties but much smoke and noise, royalist dragoons moved forward to clear parliamentarian musketeers from hedges on the flanks of the parliamentary army, and then Rupert advanced his wing.
The cavalry opposed to him, that of Sir James Ramsey, at first stood stock still, then turned and fled after one of their troops changed sides. Rupert advanced into Kineton where there was considerable killing, whilst his second line under Sir John Byron, galloped off wildly in pursuit of the fugitives. Thus the bulk of the royalist cavalry to all intents and purposes galloped off the field.
The royalist foot advanced under Sir Jacob Astley, and the parliamentary foot under Charles Essex broke before they engaged.
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There was general disruption as some of the parliamentary horse succeeded in reaching and disabling some of the royalist artillery in the rear, but they soon fell back, only to be fired upon by their own men who mistook them for royalists. The earl of Essex launched a severe assault on the brigade of Sir Nicholas Byron, and in this fighting the earl of Lindsey was killed, his son standing guard over the body until he fell into parliamentary hands.
The royal standard was cut from the hands of its bearer, Sir Edmund Verney, and carried away. A royalist charge under Sir Charles Lucas became caught up in the pursuit of fugitives, and came to nothing. Despite advice to the contrary, Rupert chose not to charge again, and night fell on what is generally considered to have been a stalemated battlefield, where total losses were about 3, men in all. In essence, if he could now capitalise upon it, Charles I had won a strategic advantage.
When the King left York, the royalist commander, the earl of Cumberland, proved himself loyal but incapable of resisting the Fair-faxes and their allies. Until December , the royalists were on the defensive, but as a result of an agreement between Yorkshire royalists and the earl of Newcastle, the latter marched into the county in that month to take overall control. He brought a well disciplined and well trained army, and the parliamentary forces hovered around their strongholds— Scarborough, Hull and the West Riding cloth towns—instead of raiding at will.
To this end he set up major garrisons to divide Hull from the cloth towns, and pushed down into Lincolnshire and Nottinghamshire. The earl was deflected for a while by the arrival at Bridlington of the Queen with arms and munitions for the main army, but her arrival led to the defection of Sir Hugh Cholmeley from the Parliament, and Scarborough passed into royalist hands. In Hull, the Hothams were thought to be considering a similar move. Unable to prevent royalist cavalry under George Goring from crossing the Wharfe, Sir Thomas began to fall back but was caught at Seacroft Moor on 30 March and his infantry suffered heavy losses.
The royalists took numerous prisoners, and Sir Thomas Fairfax left them to their fate. In May he struck back, launching a surprise assault on the garrison town of Wakefield held by numerically superior forces under Goring. After savage fighting in the streets, Goring was taken with the bulk of his infantry, and the royalists fled the town. The earl of Newcastle, concerned for the safety of the Queen on her way to Oxford, finally had his hands free in early June. On the 22nd of that month he stormed Howley House, a major parliamentarian strongpoint in the West Riding, and on 30 June clashed with the main parliamen tary field army at Adwalton Moor near Bradford.
The royalist army, about 10, strong, faced 4, parliamentarian regulars and a sizeable number of poorly armed countrymen, but initially the parliamentarians had the best of it. A desperate assault by royalist pikemen, however, broke open the parliamentarian lines and a renewed royalist cavalry charge destroyed the cohesion of the parliamentarian left wing.
The earl swept on and took Bradford, and Leeds fell when royalist prisoners there broke free and seized arms in the town.
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The Fairfaxes fled into Hull, where the wavering Hothams had been arrested on suspicion, and the port was thus safeguarded for the Parliament. After advancing into Lincolnshire to repair damage sustained by royalist forces there, he drew back into Yorkshire, having been advised to deal with Hull before he left the county behind for good.
Lord Fairfax had raised substantial troops in the port, and was in contact with forces across the Humber. The second siege of Hull began on 2 September after the town of Beverley was surprised and Sir Thomas Fairfax chased from it. Lord Fairfax ordered the dykes around Hull to be cut and the lowlying land flooded, occasioning problems for besieged and besieger alike, but a necessary move. The Humber still provided a lifeline for the garrison, and troops moved back and forth across it regularly. Newcastle, now elevated as marquess, ignored advice to move south, and doggedly pursued the siege.
There was considerable skirmishing, the royalists fairly safe within their earthworks constructed around the town, but on 11 October the crucial action was fought. After severe fighting, the royalists withdrew, and the marquess abandoned the siege, as he had abandoned the idea of a march south. Whilst Cumberland and Westmorland remained more or less under royalist control, the battleground was Lancashire. Numerous incidents in the county during the summer had paved the way for something more dangerous after August , but the royalist commander, the earl of Derby, was deprived of most of his best regiments for service with the King elsewhere.
Consequently, he was unable to offer resistance to the parliamentary forces based on Manchester. A siege of that town, begun on 24 September, was abandoned by the earl on 2 October, and tentative truce talks were initiated. These failed, and a series of localised skirmishes ensued.
The royalists consolidated around Preston, Wigan and Warrington, setting up headquarters in the latter town.
Whilst busy recruiting in November, the earl raided into Cheshire without success, and a form of stalemate prevailed in Lancashire until early into An indecisive encounter at Leigh early in December followed a royalist defeat on nearby Hinfield Moor on or around 27 November. The royalist commanders were more concerned about their financial position, and the need to repair losses in men before launching a general war.
On 15 December they won a small action on Houghton Common, but on 24 December a royalist garrison put hastily into Leigh was driven out by troops from Manchester. Get the item you ordered or get your money back. Learn more - opens in new window or tab. Contact seller.
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Learn More - opens in a new window or tab. Report item - opens in a new window or tab. Seller assumes all responsibility for this listing. Item specifics Condition: Used: An item that has been used previously. Due to this, each analysis has been carried out at different times over the last five years. The main reason for using data collected close after the last major conflict in each settlement is to avoid mistakenly identifying buildings that have been cleared in rehabilitation efforts with buildings that have been destroyed during conflict.
This has then been included for the majority of settlements assessed. The methods used to visualise the data within maps include density analysis, in the form of heat maps. A heat map creates a surface to visualise damage density, with darker areas showing a greater concentration of destroyed and severely damaged structures see page 8 for an example. Analysis has also been carried out to show relative density of damage by neighbourhood. This has been calculated on a per hectare basis - the number of damage points per hectare of the neighbourhood. This allows for some comparability of damage between neighbourhoods, while accounting for their different sizes.
The method is however limited in that the building density varies across cities, so it favours more densely built up areas. ReliefWeb has been the leading online source for reliable and timely humanitarian information on global crises and disasters since Learn more about ReliefWeb.
Many of you more than , subscribers at the last count! Published on 16 Mar — View Original. Download PDF The problems created by damage intersect, with far reaching effects: In Deir-ez-Zor, it was reported by an aid worker that the majority of medical facilities in some neighbourhoods had been destroyed, leading to the displacement of medical staff. Visual analysis The methods used to visualise the data within maps include density analysis, in the form of heat maps. Primary country Syrian Arab Republic.