The DPT3 immunization rate is measured as the number of children that have received their third dose of the diphtheria, pertussis whooping cough , and tetanus toxoid vaccine divided by the target population the number of children surviving their first year of life. The measles immunization rate is measured as the number of children that have received their first dose of a measles-containing vaccine divided by the same target population.
Surveys are frequently used in conjunction with administrative data; in some instances—where administrative data differ substantially from survey results—surveys constitute the sole source of information on immunization coverage levels. There are a number of reasons survey data may be used over administrative data; for instance, in some cases, lack of precise information on the size of the target population the denominator can make immunization coverage difficult to estimate from administrative data alone. Estimates of the most likely true level of immunization coverage are based on the data available, consideration of potential biases, and contributions of local experts.
Scorecard LICs that score above the median are considered to be passing this indicator. MCC generally strives to measure outcomes rather than inputs, but health outcomes can be very slow to adjust to policy changes. Therefore, the Health Expenditures indicator is used to gauge the extent to which governments are making investments in the health and well-being of their citizens. Questions regarding this indicator may be directed to nhaweb who. All can be financed through domestic funds or through external resources mainly as grants passing through the government or loans channeled through the national budget.
GGHE includes both recurrent and investment expenditures including capital transfers made during the year. Figures are originally estimated in million national currency units million NCU and in current prices. While MCC generally strives to measure outcomes rather than inputs, educational outcome indicators can be very slow to adjust to policy changes, and adequate data on educational quality do not yet exist in a consistent manner across a large number of countries.
Therefore, the Primary Education Expenditures indicator is used to gauge the extent to which governments are currently making investments in the education of their citizens. Research shows that, for given levels of quality, well-managed and well-executed government spending on primary education can improve educational attainment and increase economic growth. Research shows that regions that begin with higher levels of education generally see a larger poverty impact of economic growth.
UIS compiles primary education expenditure data from official responses to surveys and from reports provided by education authorities in each country. Questions regarding the UIS data may be directed to survey uis. UIS attempts to measure total current and capital expenditure on primary education at every level of administration—central, regional, and local.
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UIS data generally include subsidies for private education, but not foreign aid for primary education. UIS data may also exclude spending by religious schools, which plays a significant role in many developing countries. Government outlays on primary education include expenditures on services provided to individual pupils and students and expenditures on services provided on a collective basis.
Primary education includes the administration, inspection, operation, or support of schools and other institutions providing primary education at ISCED level 1. It also includes literacy programs for students too old for primary school. Universal basic education is an important determinant of economic growth and poverty reduction.
Questions regarding this indicator may be directed to survey uis. This is measured as the total number of female students enrolled in the last grade of primary regardless of age , minus the number of female students repeating the last grade of primary, divided by the total female population of the standard entrance age of the last grade of primary. The primary completion rate reflects the primary cycle as defined by the International Standard Classification of Education ISCED , ranging from three or four years of primary education in a very small number of countries to five or six years in most countries , to seven years in a small number of countries.
For the countries that changed their primary cycle, the most recent ISCED primary cycle is applied consistently to the whole series. Secondary education for girls ensures they receive both the benefits of primary education and the additional benefits linked to further education. Lower secondary school is defined as a program typically designed to complete the development of basic skills and knowledge which began at the primary level. In many countries, the educational aim is to lay the foundation for lifelong learning and individual development. The programs at this level are usually on a subject-oriented pattern, requiring specialized teachers for each subject area.
The end of this level often coincides with the end of compulsory education. Improving child health leads to a more productive and healthier workforce both presently and in the future. Inadequate water and sanitation is the second leading cause of child mortality; it kills more young children than AIDS, malaria, and measles combined. Questions regarding this indicator may be directed to ciesin. Environmental protection of biomes and the biodiversity and ecosystems within those biomes supports long-term economic growth by providing essential ecosystem goods and services such as natural capital, fertile soil, climate regulation, clean air and water, renewable energy, and genetic diversity.
This indicator measures the ability of the government to formulate and implement sound policies and regulations that permit and promote private sector development. Improved regulatory quality can promote economic growth by creating effective and efficient incentives for the private sector. Conversely, burdensome regulations have a negative impact on economic performance through economic waste and decreased productivity. This indicator is an index combining up to 15 different assessments and surveys, depending on availability, each of which receives a different weight, depending on its estimated precision and country coverage.
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This indicator evaluates whether and to what extent governments are investing in secure land tenure. Secure land tenure plays a central role in the economic growth process by giving people long-term incentives to invest and save their income, enhancing access to essential public services, allowing for more productive use of time and money than protecting land rights, facilitating use of land as collateral for loans, and contributing to social stability and local governance. Questions regarding the IFC indicators may be directed to doingbusiness worldbank. This composite indicator is calculated as the weighted average of three indicators.
To calculate the Days and Cost of Registering a Property indicators, local property lawyers, notaries and property registries provide information on procedures as well as the time and cost to complete each of them. To make the data comparable across countries, several assumptions about the parties to the transaction, the property and the procedures are used. This indicator measures the depth of available credit information and the effectiveness of collateral and bankruptcy laws in facilitating lending.
Questions regarding this indicator may be directed to doingbusiness worldbank. The Access to Credit composite indicator is calculated by taking the simple average of two IFC indicators, which have been normalized and ranked on equivalent scales:. The index ranges from 0 to 12, with higher scores indicating that collateral and bankruptcy laws are better designed to expand access to credit.
The index ranges from 0 to 8, with higher values indicating the availability of more credit information, from either a public credit registry or a private credit bureau, to facilitate lending decisions. If the credit registry or bureau is not operational or has coverage of less than 0. This indicator measures the time and cost of complying with all procedures officially required for an entrepreneur to start up and formally operate an industrial or commercial business. The ability to start a business is important for encouraging entrepreneurship and economic growth.
Local lawyers and other professionals examine specific regulations that impact the time and cost of opening a new business. These include obtaining all necessary licenses and permits and completing any required notifications, verifications or inscriptions with relevant authorities. After a study of laws, regulations and publicly available information on business entry, a detailed list of procedures, time, cost and paid-in minimum capital requirements is developed. Subsequently, local incorporation lawyers and government officials complete and verify the data on applicable procedures, the time and cost of complying with each procedure under normal circumstances and the paid-in minimum capital.
On average four law firms participate in each country. Information is also collected on the sequence in which procedures are to be completed and whether procedures may be carried out simultaneously. It is assumed that any required information is readily available and that all government and non-government agencies involved in the start-up process function efficiently and without corruption.
If answers by local experts differ, inquiries continue until the data are reconciled. Two types of businesses are considered under the methodology. They are identical in all aspects, except that one company is owned by five married women and other by five married men. To make the data comparable across countries, several assumptions about the business and the procedures are used.
The business:. But there was no doubt that their presence in the capital had frightened the new bourgeoisie--they had expelled the counter-revolutionary threat of Huerta, but having done so they themselves now became the obstacle to the forging of a new national state. Within a month Carranza, a wealthy landowner and a state governor under the D'az dictatorship, became the leader of the new Mexico. His national project was well defined in an early decree recognising the right to private ownership of the land.
It was consistent, therefore, that he should see it as his first task to mobilise forces against Zapata and Villa, including the infamous Red Batallions of workers mobilised against Zapata. As the military assault on Zapata progressed he was driven further and further into his Morelos redoubt and to a large extent besieged there. At the same time, however, Zapata and his advisers were enacting a series of decrees and creating a range of organisations within the besieged province which suggested that Zapata was moving rapidly in an increasingly radical direction in his social and political thinking.
Under siege from a national army, Zapata began to recognise the necessity of an alliance between peasants and workers, for the socialisation of land and property, and for radical democratic forms. He was no unlettered peasant in any case--he had been aware of and in contact with anarchist ideas from an early age.
Their distrust of the bourgeoisie and emphasis on mass action clearly convinced him, but their refusal to address issues of political power and the control of the state go far to explain Zapata's decision to withdraw from Mexico City and from the battle for the conquest of power early in His critical reappraisal of that experience was now tragically taking place under siege conditions and with few possibilities of making contact with the urban working class movement.
That experience, that history, has an unmistakable resonance for the end of century inheritors of Zapata's mantle. In fact it was not the EZLN's first armed action. The decision to move to armed struggle had been taken at a meeting of indigenous community leaders in Yet it had remained an almost wholly secret war until 1 January despite the impact of the protest march of which for the first time brought the rural struggle to the heart of the capital.
Then the limited armed actions provoked an extraordinary and rapid response outside Chiapas, which almost certainly restrained Salinas from the repressive military response he and previous presidents had employed as their prime instrument for addressing the problems of the people of Chiapas. This time he announced on 12 January a unilateral cease fire by the government.
It was then that the negotiating committee of ski-masked Zapatistas, wearing indigenous dress, became an internationally recognised phenomenon. And chief among them was their central spokesperson, the Spanish-speaking Subcomandante Marcos. Though he appeared to be the leader of the movement, he insisted that he was speaking on behalf of a Clandestine Revolutionary Committee whose elected membership reflected the spectrum of communities and ethnicities that made up the Zapatista National Liberation Army.
Alma Guillermoprieto ascribes the reluctance of the Mexican government to move against the Zapatistas entirely to the impact of Marcos: The huge, and life-saving outpourings of support in favour of a group that was essentially unheard-of less than two weeks earlier, and that espoused the violent overthrow of the state, was almost as astonishing as the rebellion itself. The role of Marcos is undoubtedly central, though the debate about his politics and his significance in the struggle has generated rather more heat than light.
But Guillermoprieto herself makes the kind of assertions that would be repeated in the months after the insurrection across the world. That the movement was 'unheard-of'. By that she means that it was not known outside Chiapas--and the temptation is therefore to assume that it had not existed at all before a variety of external enthusiasts seized hold of the Zapatista cause. As I tried to show earlier, both Zapatismo and its component communities in struggle had quite a long history.
Secondly she asserts that the EZLN 'advocated the violent overthrow of society'; yet other enthusiastic supporters proclaim that 'unlike almost all previous revolutions, the Zapatista revolution does not aim to take power'. Marcos learned his politics during the Mexican student movement of which ended in savage repression on the eve of the Olympic Games of that year, when or more students were gunned down in cold blood during a public meeting at Three Cultures Square, Taletelolco, in Mexico City on 2 October.
Those leaders of the movement who were not killed or imprisoned and tortured often went into hiding to escape their government persecutors. The student movement was beset by political argument. The Communist Party, for its part, had long been compromised for its complicity with elements of the ruling group and its collusion with the extraordinarily corrupt Mexican trade union leadership.
The revolutionary socialist tradition, for its part, had few advocates in Mexico. It was logical, therefore, that Maoism should take root among the generation of student revolutionaries seeking an international ideology embedded in a nationalist tradition and adapted to the withdrawal into the countryside that followed the repression of A document produced in mid in the course of the student movement in the capital presaged that future direction. The 'people' to which it referred reflected a politics of alliances based on a bloc of several classes defined by their common exclusion from the state.
The organisation's 'mass line' was bitterly critical of the existing organisations of the left, which it saw as having only tenuous roots in the mass movement and of being locked into an antagonistic but permanent relationship with the PRI. Their general political strategy--the 'mass line' mentioned earlier--was critical of armed struggle and profoundly sceptical of the Leninist conception of the party. Some eight years later another activist from the same political tradition would arrive in the area and begin the construction of the EZLN--Marcos.
The alliance between Maoist activists and representatives of liberation theology like Samuel Ruiz may at first glance seem a curious one. But it is certainly my view that these two disparate political currents shaped the political rhetoric which would later become such an object of fascination for the supporters of the Zapatistas around the world. What the two perspectives shared was an insistence on direct democracy and self activity, and a clear reaction against the Stalinist variants of Communism whose sorry history of compromise with dictatorships and state bureaucracy was particularly striking in Mexico, though it was a phenomenon repeated throughout the continent.
That anti-Stalinism expressed itself as a deep hostility to the concept of the revolutionary party, or the caricatures of a Leninist model which had proliferated in Latin America's more recent history. For the Maoist currents, too, Cuba's absorption into the Soviet bloc ensured that neither Cuba itself, nor the kind of guerrilla politics which it had espoused up to could offer an alternative. Expressed at two Bishops' Conferences at Medellin, Colombia , and Puebla, Mexico , the new theology was perhaps personified by Camilo Torres, the young Colombian priest who 'opted to struggle with the poor', joined the guerrillas, and was killed in Priests now emerged in the leadership of mass organisations of struggle throughout Latin America--and defended their use of arms where the repression was most bitter, as in Guatemala, El Salvador and Colombia.
In fact, the struggles of the s produced a series of internal conflicts between organisations and their leaders.
Separate Maoist factions within Chiapas each accused the other of factionalism and authoritarianism. Marcos and the EZLN had begun military training for 'self defence', of which many sectors of the church were deeply suspicious. On the other hand, and paradoxically, it was the liberation priests who were most suspicious of the contact with official agencies for credit, land negotiations, services, etc which many of the Maoist cadres advocated--as part of their 'politics on two fronts' strategy. As the strains and tensions developed through the s, a new factor entered the equation.
An aggressive Protestant evangelism was particularly active in Guatemala, where military ruler Rios Montt was a born again Christian, and in Nicaragua, where over sects organised opposition to the Sandinistas. They began to organise in Chiapas in the same period, exploiting suspicions of a radical church among some of the better off peasants, raising issues of gender discrimination and particularly of contraception among women who had become increasingly self confident precisely because of their role in the struggles of those years.
And yet, despite the spreading influence of Protestant fundamentalism and liberation theology's profound suspicion of the Mexican state on the one hand, and resistance to armed struggle on the other, by the majority of Chiapas's indigenous population were ready for war--and the EZLN would lead it, as the manifestation of the democratic determination of the communities themselves.
What began as a violent insurgency in an isolated region mutated into a non-violent though no less disruptive 'social netwar' that engaged the attention of activists from far and wide and had nationwide and foreign repercussions for Mexico. The term 'social netwar' is certainly not one with which I was familiar. But it points to that element of Zapatismo that has so fascinated those beyond Mexico.
While wearing Indian dress and presenting themselves to the world through the multiple languages of indigenous Mexico, the Zapatistas--and Marcos in particular--have used the internet as a free communications highway. The paradox is moving and in some curious way quite beautiful. The US military who generated this many-branched information superhighway to facilitate internal communication can hardly have intended it to be used to generate solidarity for an armed struggle in an isolated redoubt in southern Mexico.
There was also something about the nature of the messages that Marcos sent that caught the imagination. Above all it had a powerful moral charge. Here were the very poorest addressing the wealthiest and most powerful directly. The messages from Marcos were able to leap the encircling troops some 12, of them that Salinas immediately sent to Chiapas. If Salinas agreed to a ceasefire just 12 days after the rising, we can assume that he did so believing that the Zapatistas, who had by now returned to their communities, could be besieged, strangled and eventually overrun.
The fact that they were not undoubtedly has to do with their ability to speak to a listening world, and to the almost instantaneous movement of solidarity and support that they generated, particularly among students and workers in Mexico City. For Salinas, moving into an election year and with the eyes of the world focused on Mexico, Chiapas was a problem. His chosen candidate, Colosio, was murdered in March by assassins and for reasons still unknown. The industry in Marcos dolls and memorabilia began very quickly.
The armed confrontation between the Zapatistas and the Mexican state had already ceased. In the nearly seven years since the rising the number of Mexican armed personnel in the area has quadrupled, the encirclement of the Zapatistas is now almost complete, their area of control has been reduced and continual inroads into their communities have left many dead and those left alive deprived of water, electricity and physical access to the outside world.
Yet there has been no resumption of war other than the 'netwar'. When Marcos and the negotiators returned to the communities with a peace agreement at the end of March , the supporters of the EZLN rejected the agreements. The timing was highly significant, coming as it did some three months before voting began for the national presidential elections.
Ernesto Zedillo, Salinas's nominee to replace the murdered Colosio, was the PRI's candidate--a virtual guarantee, at least up till then, of an overwhelming victory. Although the candidate was anything but inspiring in his public appearances, he did manage to gather the support of wide sections of Mexican society seeking change; had the vote-counting computer system not inexplicably crashed just as the final votes were in, he would almost certainly have won. In the intervening six years he had lost much of his symbolic significance. He was a reformer, perhaps, but within the system rather than outside it.
Time and again the PRD had negotiated with Salinas rather than opposed him, and the wide range of struggles against Salinas's economic policy had not always been able to count on his support. As the elections approached, the PRD opportunistically identified with the widespread popular support for the Zapatistas throughout the country. From the point of view of a besieged Zapatista enclave in Chiapas, speaking across the airwaves to a massive audience but unconnected in any organisational way to them, the PRD was offering a network of contacts beyond Chiapas.
By the year his support had declined and Fox, candidate of the PAN, won a largely democratic election. Much has been written about the frequently paradoxical nature of Marcos's lengthy bulletins to the world. Often poetic, personal, analytical and mythic at the same time, their curious and lyrical language has often been celebrated as a new political language for a postmodern revolution.
The origins of the movement marry a sense of the economic and political realities of globalisation with a visionary quality of high moral content that echoes with the metaphors of religious language. Marcos's occasional excursions into fable or children's stories are charming and often powerful in their simplicity. But the paradoxes and internal contradictions also suggest a pluralistic vision, a notion of a political and imaginative space in which different views, visions and strategies for change can coexist without resolution.
Aesthetically, it is pleasing and complex. Politically, it is paralysing.
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The concepts derived from the struggles of previous decades persist here--centrally in the evasion of the question of power. It is a curious 'quality' in a revolutionary organisation that it does not seek power. What then is the nature of the revolution they advocate? At one level, the demands are absolutely clear and correspond to the needs and interests of many of the individuals and communities of the region--particularly as far as land on the one hand, and the recognition of indigenous political and cultural rights on the other are concerned.
At the same time, the experience of recent times has led them to a profound distrust of the intentions and integrity of the Mexican state--an extremely well founded suspicion. That would explain the rejection of the March agreements and subsequent accords.
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But if one thing has become incontestably clear as a result, in part, of the Zapatista rising itself, it is that there is no space outside the system--globalisation does not tolerate free territories. The meeting attracted many supporters to the specially built grass amphitheatre deep in Zapatista territory. For many of them the long walk through the jungle carrying their own plate, fork and spoon will certainly have been a novel experience. Equally it raised the national profile of the Zapatistas.
But the movement was already at an impasse in many ways. The PRD was demonstrably an electoral organisation whose sole concern was winning elections. Their commitment to Zapatismo was not a principled one. Equally, it was clear that the confrontation between the Zapatistas and the Mexican state had already reached stalemate.
The level of popular support and sympathy the EZLN enjoyed could hardly be higher, yet it was physically trapped inside Chiapas. More importantly it was ideologically enclosed too. Its local roots were firm, its representativity unquestioned and its claim for rights just by any standards. Morally, it dominated the high ground--especially in contrast to a government, now run by Zedillo, which was as corrupt as its predecessors and as committed to a full neo-liberal agenda of rising unemployment, falling living standards, full and rapid privatisation, cuts in public spending and a free market in all commodities including land.
There is little doubt that the balance of political elements within the Zapatista message began to change by late the emphasis on the issue of indigenous rights was combined with the increasingly central demand for autonomy.
As George Collier put it, the Zapatistas were beginning to negotiate with the government as a parallel national movement. In some sense, as the encirclement tightened around Chiapas, the Zapatistas were moving towards the opposite conclusion from the one that Zapata himself had begun to reach during the siege of Morelos. Any encounter between the Mexican state, nearly 50, of whose troops are currently in Chiapas, and the Zapatista enclave would be an absurdly unequal one.
The state's concern was not necessarily with the Zapatistas themselves, but rather with the resonance they might have beyond the state of Chiapas. As Zedillo's economic policies began to bite, there was growing discontent and pockets of fierce resistance began to emerge. Yet there was also a collapse in levels of union membership--a result of a long history of manipulation of trade unions by the PRI and the presidency.
The regular Consultas --popular plebiscites--organised by the supporters of the Zapatistas confirmed again and again the enormous level of support for Chiapas. But if, as John Ross suggests, the Zapatistas's original appeal to the PRD had been intended to address the mass of its working class supporters directly, that had manifestly failed to develop into any form of national organisation.
Defined as a class movement, the Zapatistas could develop joint actions of class defence and co-ordinated struggles.
Defined as a national movement, in however direct a way, the Zapatistas were constrained to calling for support for their actions at the very time when a vicious official siege was making it virtually impossible for them to move at all. The symbolic power of the Zapatistas was unabated, their actual ability to act increasingly contained. In the rest of the country structural adjustment and NAFTA are producing exactly the results its instigators anticipated. As the Mexican economy grows and plays host to foreign investors in growing numbers, 50 percent of the population live in poverty and 15 percent beneath the extreme poverty line.
Forty million Mexicans are undernourished million have no access to health whatsoever. This points up the central dilemma in the Zapatista experience. If the early alliance with the PRD suggested a hope of a reform of the state, then that hope now lies in ruins. As the rest of Latin America has discovered, social democrats or nationalist revolutionaries who find themselves administering programmes of austerity and structural adjustment become neo-liberals with unnerving speed.
The language of rights, which has increasingly dominated Zapatista rhetoric, also presumes an intermediary state, or the existence of neutral agencies. The role has been filled at the level of political debate by NGOs, which have also attempted to plug some of the holes left by the abandonment of public services by the new alliance of state and private capital. But they are by definition unable to propose an alternative project for the state. Thus all the lobbying in the end comes down to whether those who walk hand in glove with global capital are willing from time to time to offer a crumb or two of justice.
But it is a contradiction in terms to expect redistributionist policies or social justice from governments whose very survival depends on administering programmes designed to accumulate an increasing proportion of wealth in the hands of powerful international economic actors.
The Zapatista movement has generated movements of solidarity across the world. At one level it has coalesced around a defence of the oppressed--the exemplary victims of neo-liberalism and corporate greed.
That is their symbolic power. An anarchist friend of mine suggested to me after Seattle that 'this was all because of the Zapatistas'. Did he mean their example? In part that is what he meant--but beyond that he saw them as representatives of a new politics. Zapatismo does not seek power, only justice; Zapatismo does not acknowledge leaders, but it is democratic in the extreme; Zapatismo is not a party, but a living and changing movement; Zapatismo has used the internet to create an international connection between all those who reject a capitalism red in tooth and claw.
The moral authority of Marcos is, of course, enormous. But it also has political implications. Where does solidarity with Zapatismo lead its supporters politically? In Mexico itself there are some 29 sites of armed struggle now, with the state of Guerrero--as poor and brutalised as its southern neighbour--chief among them.